Cast Aside by the Burger Court: Blacks in Quest of Justice and Education by Reid, Inez Smith
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 49 | Issue 1 Article 5
10-1-1973
Cast Aside by the Burger Court: Blacks in Quest of
Justice and Education
Inez Smith Reid
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Inez S. Reid, Cast Aside by the Burger Court: Blacks in Quest of Justice and Education, 49 Notre Dame L. Rev. 105 (1973).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol49/iss1/5
CAST ASIDE BY THE BURGER COURT: BLACKS IN QUEST
OF JUSTICE AND EDUCATION
Inez Smith Reid*
The Burger Court's cadenced stride toward constitutional conservatism no
longer can be dismissed as a strategy employed, on an emergency basis, to check
the flaming emotionalism of the sixties. For those Black American interest
groups which have viewed the Supreme Court, steadfastly, as a protective
mechanism for numerous years, it is now abundantly clear that that Court has
ceased to recognize either a traditional civil rights movement or a Black libera-
tion movement, let alone legitimate the goals of either movement.' Moreover,
it is crystal clear that the Burger Court, in an amazingly short period of time,
has taken back what little the Supreme Court had given during the intense and
concerted battle for civil rights in the mid-fifties and the decade of the sixties.
The famous Carolene Products footnote urging the victims of discrimination to
seek redress in the courts if it could not be secured in political (legislative and
executive) arenas lies as timber splintered in a million pieces and useless as a
strong foundation capable of weathering hurricanes and tornadoes let alone
seasonal thunderstorms. Those whom executive branches and legislatures have
neglected persistently and perniciously for countless years now have been hurtled
right back into the arms of executives and legislators as the Burger Court persists
in dismantling, piece by piece, those minimal and precarious steps which the
Warren Court labored to construct in the name of civil rights and liberties.
It is impossible, in this brief article, to concentrate on every Burger Court
decision perceived as hostile to the nation's Black populace. This discussion will
focus on two broad areas which have enormous impact on the growth and well-
being of the Black community: the criminal process and education.
I. Whatever Happened to the Spirit of Miranda v. Arizona?
Characteristic of the Burger Court's approach to criminal procedural safe-
guards is a gross insensitivity to Attica, to the Toombs, to the D.C. jail, and to
all the other detention centers which erupted from a highly volcanic state in
the early seventies, eventually spilling over as a seething mixture of intense anger,
blood, and death.2 Typical of the Warren Court replacement is its insensitivity
* Associate Professor of Political Science, Barnard College, Columbia University; Executive
Director, Black Women's Community Development Foundation; B.A., Tufts, LL.B., Yale, M.A.,
U.C.L.A., Ph.D., Columbia.
1 For the author's earlier evaluation of the Burger Court's impact on the civil rights
movement see Reid, The Burger Court and the Civil Rights Movement: The Supreme Court
Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away, 3 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 410 (1972).
2 For information on the conditions and causes of prison disturbances and rebellions see
ATTICA, THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA
(1972); Moore and Moore, Some Reflections: On the Criminal justice System, Prisons and
Repressions, 17 HowARD L.J. 832 (1973); Burns, The Black Prisoner As Victim, 1 BLACK L.J.
120 (1971) ; Hawkins, Attica Revisited: The Prospect for Prison Reform, 11 ARIZONA L. Rv.
747 (1972).
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to and callous disregard for the George Jacksons and the Martin Sostres' of this
nation, of their need for the minimal standards enunciated in In Re Gault" and
Miranda v. Arizona,' and of their need not to be regarded as just so many "in-
visible men" cast off as odious undesirables to rot in sardine-like, rodent infested
excuses for rehabilitation centers.
If McKeiver v. Pennsylvania-6 and Harris v. New York' caused many of
those encouraged by In Re Gault and Miranda to choke, later decisions' emanat-
ing from the Burger Court may well have precipitated many strangulations. It
is clear that the erosion, begun so abruptly in Harris, continued at full speed.
From Apodaca v. Oregon,' where the Court sustained split jury verdicts, to
Kirby v. Illinois, ° where the sixth amendment was held inapplicable to events
prior to the commencement of the adversary process, to United States v. Ash,"
the evisceration of criminal procedural safeguards is inescapable. In Ash, decided
on June 21, 1973, the Court held that no right to counsel exists during pretrial
photographic displays. The facts of Ash are startling to say the least. During
1966 a bank robbery occurred in the District of Columbia. In February 1966,
before any charges were made, four black and white photos of four Black males
including defendant Ash were shown to four witnesses. "All four witnesses made
uncertain identifications of Ash's picture." 2 On April 1, 1966, an indictment
was returned on defendant Ash. An incredibly long time later, in May 1968,
Ash finally proceeded to trial. Less than twenty-four hours before his trial an
FBI agent and a prosecutor displayed five color photos to the four witnesses who
had made uncertain identifications in 1966 of the black and white photos.
Three of the witnesses chose Ash's picture and one was unable to make any
selection from the five photos. At trial; one witness positively identified Ash and
three made uncertain identifications.
In Ash, as in cases to be discussed later, the Court adhered to a distinguish-
ing process which simply defies rational scrutiny. While counsel is required and
essential in corporeal identification, as in Wade, the same is not true for photo-
3 George Jackson, arrested at age 18 for stealing $70 from a gasoline station and sentenced
to one year to life for that act, was one of the famed Soledad Brothers. Jackson was killed by
prison guards while allegedly attempting to escape. For greater detail on his life and thoughts
see SOLEDAD BROTHER. THE PRISON LETTERS OF GEORGE JACKSON (1970). Martin Sostre is
an Afro-American prison inmate who has endured and contested very harsh prison conditions.
For insight into Sostre and his efforts to improve prison living conditions see Copeland, Tan
CRIME OF MARTIN SOSRE (1970); Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
4 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
5 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6 403 U.S. 528 '(19711. The Burger Court refused to rule that jury trials are essential in
juvenile court proceedings. For a discussion of McKiever see Reid, supra note 1 at 435-438.
7 401 U.S. 222 (1971). Harris made an obvious but unfortunate intrusion on the scope
and effectiveness of Miranda by holding that an illegally obtained confession could be used to
impeach a defendant's credibility although it could not be admitted as evidence of guilt. See
Dershowitz and Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic
of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971).
8 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967),
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) are all
Warren Court decisions now under the chipping process of the Burger Court.
9 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
10 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
11 93 S.Ct. 2568 (1973).
12 Id. at 2570.
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graphic identification. Apparently this is true because pretrial photographic
identification does not constitute a "critical stage" of the adversary process, that
is, it does not emerge as a "trial-like confrontation" where the defendant is
physically present thus necessitating counsel "to preserve the adversary process
by compensating for advantages of the prosecuting authorities." 3 Logic is buried
irreversibly since it should be obvious that the same dangers of suggestion and
mistaken identification which were determinative in Wade on the sixth amend-
ment issue apply with equal if not more compelling force in photographic dis-
plays. Neither defendant nor his counsel was present at the photographic identi-
fication which took place in Ash on the eve of trial-more than two years after
the robbery in question. The dangers of suggestion should be manifest if prose-
cutor and witnesses huddle together less than twenty-four hours prior to trial to
examine photos. And if the pressure is on those witnesses to identify the accused
momentarily, the powers of suggestion are heightened and unavoidable. As
dissenters Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall insist, "[a]s in the line up situation,
the possibilities for impermissible suggestion in the context of a photographic
display are manifold."' 4 A prosecutor, ambitious or not, incapable of resisting
temptation may resort to facial or other bodily movements which direct a witness'
choice. Moreover, he may so choose his photos that a man of average intelligence
may be propelled toward the "proper" choice. Yet these are the kinds of risks
which the majority feel are not "[s]o pernicious that an extraordinary system of
safeguards is required."' 5 Translated, "an extraordinary system of safeguards"
means "right to counsel." Even on a purely factual basis, Ash seems to be
precisely the kind of case where "overreaching by the prosecution" needs to be
"counterbalanced" by the presence of defendant's counsel. 6 Instead, it takes its
place alongside Harris, Apodaca., and Kirby.
The distinguishing process particularly manifested itself in another ap-
proach of the Burger Court, closing avenues of legal redress to defendants. This
tactic may be observed in Preiser v. Rodriguez,' Tollett v. Henderson,"'8 and
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe" In Preiser several New York state prison inmates
brought suit, under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the loss
of good behavior time credits. Justice Stewart, writing for a six-man majority,
held that the only remedy available to the state prisoners, in this case, is federal
habeas corpus, not a Section 1983 proceeding.
One cannot help but be thoroughly confused by the labyrinthic way Justice
Stewart shaped the majority opinion. Obviously desirous of curbing prisoner
appeals to federal courts and preferring the longer route requiring exhaustion of
state remedies, the Court rudely denied the availability of a section 1983 action
to question the duration of one's stay in prison." As Justice Stewart put it, "[w]e
13 Id. at 2576.
14 Id. at 2585.
15 Id. at 2579.
16 Id. at 2575.
17 93 S.Ct. 1827 (1973).
18 93 S.Ct. 1602 (1973).
19 93 S.Ct. 1977 (1973).
20 Prisoners have appealed increasingly to the courts to relieve them of the burdens of
prison conditions and unjust sentences. See, e.g., Singer, Enforcing the Constitutional Rights of
Prisoners, 17 HowARD L.J. 823 (1973); Singer and Keating, The Courts and Prisons: A Crisis
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hold today that when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of
his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is
entitled to immediate or more speedy release from that imprisonment, his sole
federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus."'" Curiously, the Court reaffirmed an
earlier determination that penitentiary inmates have a right to bring a section
1983 action to test the validity of "living conditions and disciplinary measures
while confined.... "2
That most people, especially prisoners, would see a casual connection
between disciplinary measures and duration of stay in prison and thus not under-
stand why the Court reached one decision in Wilwording and another in Preiser
is but one of the exceedingly tortuous aspects of the Preiser labyrinth. More-
over, the meat of Justice Stewart's attempted distinction between Wilwording
and Preiser rests on three nebulous, interchangeable phrases: the "core of habeas
corpus," the "heart of habeas corpus," and the "essence of habeas corpus." If
the matter in question is found to be the "core," "heart," or "essence" of habeas
corpus, then Section 1983 does not apply even as an alternative route; habeas
corpus is the exclusive remedy. Whil we know, because the majority tell us, that
the "fact or duration" of stay joined to a right to "immediate or more speedy
release" from imprisonment is a matter of "core," "heart," and "essence" of
habeas corpus while "living conditions and disciplinary measures while confined"
are not the "core,". "heart," or "essence" of habeas corpus, we are left to ponder,
in a totally confused state, what other questions may fall neatly under the rubric
of "core," "heart," and "essence," thus eliminating the possibility of a section
1983 action and requiring instead an exclusive section 2254 habeas corpus
action.23
The majority's objective is clear; prisoners should exhaust all state remedies
before proceeding to federal courts. But as dissenters Brennan, Douglas, and
Marshall stated, the majority has constructed "[a]n ungainly and irrational
scheme that permits some prisoners to sue under section 1983, while others may
proceed only by way of petition for habeas corpus."24 The obvious effect of
Preiser will be to decrease the number of section 1983 actions brought before the
of Confrontation, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 337 (1973); and Doyle, The Court's Responsibility to the
Inmate Litigant, 56 JUDIcATURE 406 (1973) where it is estimated that "non-habeas corpus suits
commenced by state prisoners in federal district courts increased from 1,953 in fiscal 1969 to
4,139 in fiscal 1972.. ." at p. 406.
21 93 S.Ct. 1827 '(1973).
22 Id. at 1841. See also Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971) where the Court
specifically stated that "State prisoners are not held to any stricter standards of exhaustion than
other civil rights plaintiffs." Id. at 251. Wilwording regarded the 1983 action as "supplementary
to the state remedy." Thus state remedies "need not be first sought and refused before the
federal one is invoked." Id. In casting aside its previous term's Wilwording decision the
majority in Preiser plainly adopted the recommendation of the Study Group on the Caseload
of the Supreme Court that unique exhaustion requirements be imposed in prisoners' 1983
actions. See Doyle, supra note 20, at 409 n.8.
23 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a) provides for writs of habeas corpus by a "person in custody."
Sections 2254 (b) and (c) impose exhaustion of state remedies requirements before the habeas
corpus petition can be heard. In contrast, state exhaustion requirements are not built into
Section 1983 which provides simply that: "Every person who under color of any statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen . .. or other person . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in unity, or other proper proceedings for redress."
24 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1843 (1973).
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courts while simultaneously augmenting the level of frustration and waiting time
of those prisoners anxiously and desperately seeking an end to perceived in-
justices.
In the same vein is Tollett where the pernicious effects of arbitrary and
prejudicial judicial procedures, which Blacks have confronted throughout the
years, can be viewed in almost pristine form. In 1948, at the age of twenty,
Willie Lee Henderson, then a youngster with a sixth-grade education, was charged
with first-degree murder arising out of his alleged robbery of a Tennessee liquor
store. Even though Henderson had confessed to the charge without the presence
of counsel, he expressed a desire to plead not guilty. Ultimately he entered a
guilty plea on the advice of counsel and out of fear that the death penalty would
be inflicted were he to proceed to trial. After unsuccessfully waging a long fight
to have his conviction overturned on the ground of a coerced confession, Hender-
son shifted tactics and sought to upset his conviction, via state habeas corpus
proceedings, on the ground that Blacks had been excluded from the grand jury
which had returned his indictment in 1948. Failing in his state habeas corpus
action Henderson next directed his attention to the federal courts in a federal
habeas corpus petition.
ustice Powell crushed any hope Henderson had of convincing the Court
to accept his legal arguments. In the face of: 1) Tennessee's admission that
Blacks in fact had been systematically excluded from Henderson's grand jury in
1948, and 2) an affidavit by Henderson's 1948 counsel that he "did not know as
a matter of fact that Negroes were systematically excluded from Davidson
County grand jury, and that there had been no occasion to advise respondent of
any rights he had as to the composition or method of selection of that body,"2 5
Justice Powell nonetheless concluded that Henderson's "guilty plea ... forecloses
independent inquiry into the claim of discrimination in the selection of the grand
jury."2 Henderson's only recourse was to establish incompetence of counsel, or
as the Court put it, that counsel's advice "was not within the range of compe-
tence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.""7 If Henderson thought that the
end of the road was just ahead, he had but to recall the Burger Court's handling
of that issue in previous cases. In McMann v. Richardson,"8 for example, the
Court found no incompetence of counsel despite the fact that defendant's at-
torney had recommended a guilty plea without first challenging the procedures
which led to the defendant's coerced confession. Moreover, Justice Powell, in a
callous validation of past discrimination, almost casually noted the conclusion
of a Tennessee judge that "no lawyer in this state would have ever thought of
objecting to the fact that Negroes did not serve on the grand jury in 1948.""2
That conclusion, said Justice Powell, meant "the chances of [Henderson] being
able to carry the necessary burden of proof in challenging the guilty plea would
appear slim."" ° Yet, in his dissent Justice Marshall asserted: "Even cursory
research has disclosed several cases at the appellate level in which such challenges
25 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1604 (1973).
26 Id. at 1607.
27 Id. at 1608.
28 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
29 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1609 (1973).
30 Id.
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were raised by local attorneys."'" Try as he may, then, the prognosis for Hender-
son's finding some relief from his ninety-nine-year sentence in the courts, espe-
cially the Supreme Court, is extraordinarily poor.
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe12 represents yet another determination of the Burger
Court to narrow the range of available remedies to state prisoners. From fifteen
years to life is the shorthand way of remembering Chaffin. In 1969 the de-
fendant was sentenced to fifteen years on a charge of "robbery by open force or
violence," then a capital offense. Retried in 1971 and convicted by a jury, James
Chaffin found himself saddled with a life sentence despite the Court's opinion in
North Carolina v. Pearce3 which precluded judges from inflicting a more severe
sentence on retrial. Dismissing contentions of prosecutorial (and possibly juror)
vindictiveness, Justice Powell and four other justices saw no obvious contradic-
tion nor absence of logic when Chaffin was placed beside Pearce. Hence, insisted
the majority, neither the double jeopardy nor the due process clauses were
violated.
Just why the Court chose to impose a lower standard on juries than judges
on retrial cases is not clear. What is clear is that Chaf in does at least two things
to further diminish the effectiveness of that path of criminal procedural safe-
guards which the Warren Court so laboriously sought to carve out of a forest of
law enforcement justifications of arbitrary acts. First, it obviously discourages
trial by jury since defendants now know that if they are convicted and sentenced
by a jury, that sentence can be increased on retrial. Second, it discourages, via
fear, motions for new trials, appeals, and habeas corpus petitions on the part of
those defendants who elect trial by jury. That is, the convicted who are con-
vinced that they have experienced a miscarriage of justice may simply pass up
their constitutionally guaranteed protections in fear of a more severe penalty.
Chaffin who now faces life instead of the completion of a fifteen-year sentence
stands as a stark deterrent to those prisoners desiring to attack the injustices of
their trials. He also stands as a constant reaffirmation of the Burger Court's in-
sensitivity to the plight of Blacks who must pass through a wretchedly unjust
criminal process.
Whatever happened to the spirit of Miranda v. Arizona? It has been
smashed beyond recognition by the Burger Court's insensitivity and indifference
to the plight of thousands of Blacks who are propelled into the slashing hurricane
of the American judicial process and slammed hither and yon in a persistently
elusive search for justice.
II. And Whatever Happened to Brown v. Board of Education?
In 1969 Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., boldly entitled a New York Times Magazine
article, The Warren Court Is Not Likely To Be Overruled.4 As a sweeping
closing statement he predicted: "But even if the Court comes to be dominated
by Nixon appointees-which will not happen right away, if ever-it will not
31 Id. at 1613.
32 93 S.Ct. 1977 (1973).
33 395 U.S. 711 '(1969).
34 New York Times Magazine, September 7, 1969.
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overrule the great decisions of the Warren Court, or even distinguish them out
of existence.""3 We have already seen, though, that the Burger Court quickly
began an assault on the spirit of Mirandat with its 1971 decision in Harris and
continued to ignore that spirit during its 1972 term. In the field of school
desegregation and equality of educational opportunity the Burger Court also
proved less than anxious to aid school boards and school districts still con-
scientiously seeking, in 1972-73, to honor the legal mandate of Brown v. Board
of Education."
To appreciate fully the Court's handling of recent Supreme Court decisions
in the field of education, some background material is essential. Practically
every analysis of any issue touching on school desegregation or integration com-
mences with the landmark decision, Brown V. Board of Education, heralded by
most Blacks in 1954 as a long-awaited equalizer of educational opportunity,
greeted by most southern Whites as an odious, undesirable and communist-
inspired edict designed to disturb "good" relations between Negro and White.
Since 1954 many articles and essays have tried to interpret Brown or to indicate
what Brown should have said in order to endure as a rational precedent which
successfully could withstand persistent attack. 7 Chief Justice Warren focused on
the following key question while writing the unanimous Brown decision:
Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race,
even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may be
equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational op-
portunities?
To which Warren answered:
We believe it does.38
Warren went on to hold for the Court:
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate
but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently un-
equal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated
for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation
complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment. 89
Brown has been law for more than eighteen years. Yet clarity and stability
35 THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN 107 (L. Levy ed. 1972).
36 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
37 See, e.g., A. Bickel, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970);
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1 (1959); Pollak,
Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, U. PA. L. REv. 1
(1959); Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960); Bell,
School Litigation Strategies for the 1970's: New Phases in the Continuing Quest for Quality
Schools, 1970 Wis. L. Rlv. 257 (1970); Clark, Fifteen Years of Deliberate Speed, SATURDAY
REv. (Dec. 20, 1969); Carter, Equal Education Opportunity - An Overview, 1 BLACK L.J.
197 (1971).
38 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
39 Id. at 495.
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in primary and secondary education remain elusive phenomena. This elusiveness
has been heightened by efforts to apply Brown to northern, allegedly, de facto
school segregation and racial imbalance in schools as opposed to situations of
state imposed or de jure school segregation. Thus, disagreement persists as to
whether Brown's major message is: 1) the educational harm which befalls Black
children in a segregated learning situation, or 2) the evil and the constitutional
invalidity of state-imposed segregation.
As clarity and stability in education have become elusive so also has lucidity
of concept and goal. This is true no doubt because debate and passions recently
have been directed squarely toward the "busing" phenomenon and only in-
directly towards the rationale or goal of education in general and Brown I in
particular.
Many have tried to draw a clear distinction between integration and segre-
gation by contending that Brown ordered desegregation but not integration-
which is to imply that once state-imposed segregation has been terminated that
should be the end of the Court's work and no effort should be made to achieve
an intentional racial balance or mixture in the schools. Others have focused upon
the goal of equal educational opportunity which may mean equality in terms of
tangibles such as equipment and facilities, or equality in the area of intangibles
such as atmosphere and teaching abilities. Still others have stressed diversity of
association for school children, that is, the goal becomes a multiracial school
which mirrors the American multiracial society to which school children
eventually will have to acclimate themselves as they assume adult roles. Yet
others insist that Brown's thrust is in terms of quality education.
With respect to the issue of the criteria on which student assignments are
ordered, several variables have been visible in past court decisions. These in-
clude race, freedom of choice or association, and the neighborhood school con-
cept. "Race" and the "neighborhood school" concept appear to be the two
current focal points for controversy. While some believe race to be an imper-
missible criterion for busing or student assignment in any situation at all, others
feel that it can be utilized to hasten integration but not to promote segregation.
Intensive debate now revolves around the question whether school assignments
based on the neighborhood school concept are nondiscriminatory and therefore
allowable, or prejudicial to the spirit and letter of Brown and, therefore, im-
permissible. Freedom of choice as a criterion for school assignment and busing
has been rejected, at least temporarily, in Green v. County School Board.4"
Not long after Brown school systems outside the South were thrust into the
controversy over school segregation thus making concept clarification and goal
crystallization essential. Such northern communities as New Rochelle and
Manhasset, New York; Detroit and Pontiac, Michigan; Cincinnati, Ohio; and
Gary, Indiana, soon found themselves not only embroiled in emotional con-
frontations over the education of Black and White children but also mirroring
the sticky problems, nasty tempers, and hostile atmosphere which hit the
southern states in the aftermath of Brown."
40 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
41 See Taylor v. Board of Education, 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), 195 F. Supp.
231 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied 368 U.S. 940 (1961); Blocker
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In the midst of so much ferment and such intense controversy over the
value of integrated education for Black children, a heavy duty soon fell on the
Burger Court to set the nation on a smooth, but constitutionally just, course with
respect to education of Black and White pupils. The nation, including a
President and Vice President whose tendencies are to deplore desegregation
especially by busing, watched closely and anxiously as the Burger Court ap-
proached its first crucial decision on school desegregation, Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education."2
Those who read Swann and some who did not reacted immediately and
testily. " Those who interpreted Swann as encouraging massive busing to guar-
antee school segregation were sorely mistaken about what the Court really said
in Swann. In essence, Swann was a highly conservative decision in that it
limited Brown to "state-imposed" or intentional discrimination. Similarly, it
concerned itself only with the dismantling of dual school districts. Finally, its
pronouncements on busing were tentative at best since all communities could
beg off by stressing the health of their children would be impaired or the educa-
tional process significantly impinged upon by the busing process. Thus, Swann
did not really merit all the furor it created, especially in the conservative ranks
of the country. In reality, the Burger Court in Swann delivered a hidden message
to its constituents but that message was lost in the hysteria of an uneducated and
uninformed response. Had those who instantly thought the Burger Court had
betrayed them on a crucial issue been less vociferous and more studious they
would have realized that Swann was harmless in terms of increasing contact
between Black and White pupils in the same school.
That this interpretation of Swann is true is clear from the Court's decision
in Wright v. Council of City of Emporia." There the Nixon court appointees,
Chief Justice Burger, Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist, left no doubt
about their opposition to continued efforts to desegregate or integrate southern
or northern schools. Heretofore, the Supreme Court had appeared to be a unan-
imous body on school desegregation issues but Justice Stewart barely corn-
v. Board of Education, 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); Deal v. Cincinnati, 369 F.2d 55
(6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967); Bell v. School City, 324 F.2d 209 (7th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964); Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F.2d 897 (6th Cir.
1970), 438 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1971).
42 402 U.S. 1 (1971). The Swann case had been caught up in the judicial process since
1965 when Blacks sought further desegregation of schools in Charlotte and Mecklenburg
County, North Carolina. Blacks constituted 29% '(24,000) of an 84,000 total school popula-
tion. Of the 24,000 Black students some 14,000 were enrolled in "schools that were 99%
black." In a unanimous opinion Chief Justice Burger reaffirmed one of Brown's basic conclu-
sions: "state-imposed segregation by race in public schools denies the equal protection of the
laws." 402 U.S. 11. For school districts having a history of segregation Burger suggested the
following permissible tools of desegregation: "a very limited use . . . of mathematical ratios,"
"remedial altering of attendance zones," site selection for new schools, and busing. 402 U.S.
21, 24-30. See also North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971);
McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971); Davis v. Board of School Commissioners, 402 U.S.
33 (1971); and Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 47 (1971).
43 President Nixon said, "I have consistently opposed the busing of our nation's school-
children to achieve racial balance, and I am opposed to the busing of children simply for the
sake of busing." New York Times, September 5, 1971, Section 4, at 1, col. 5. And Vice Presi-
dent Agnew: "I'm against busing those children to other neighborhoods simply to achieve an
integrated status of a larger geographical entity." Id. col. 4. For additional opposition to
Swann from the political arena see Reid, supra note 1, at 419-420 n. 44.
44 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
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manded a majority for his decision in Emporia. Put simply, Emporia Town in
Virginia decided to become a separate political entity after the district court
ordered implementation of a desegregation plan. By becoming a city, Emporia
Town could escape the district court's mandate. The majority saw through this
subterfuge when it stated: "Only when it became clear-fifteen years after our
decision in Brown. . .- that segregation in the county system was finally to be
abolished, did Emporia attempt to take its children out of the county system." '45
This fact drove the majority to conclude that: ". . . Emporia's establishment of
a separate system would actually impede the progress of dismantling the existing
dual system."" Further, said the majority, "desegregation is not achieved by
splitting a single school system operating 'white schools' and 'Negro schools' into
two new systems, each operating unitary schools within its borders, where one
of the two new systems is, in fact, 'white' and the other is, in fact, 'Negro.' ,47
Clearly Emporia should have been regarded as a case "having a long history
of maintaining two sets of schools in a single school system deliberately operated
to carry out a governmental policy to separate pupils in schools solely on the
basis of race."48 Yet the Nixon appointees vehemently disagreed with Justice
Stewart's majority opinion. Even though Emporia was clothed in a factual
Brown dress-southern situation, state-imposed segregation, dual school system-
the dissenters wanted to approve the creation of Emporia City. "If the severance
of the two systems were permitted to proceed," said Chief Justice Burger speaking
for the dissenters, "the assignment of children to schools would depend solely on
their residence. County residents would attend county schools, and city residents
would attend city schools. Assignment to schools would in no sense depend on
race."549 Insisting on closing their eyes to Emporia's uncanny resemblance to a
Brown-type case, the Nixon appointees accused the district court of "reaching
for some hypothetical perfection in racial balance, rather than the elimination of
a dual school system."5 Thus, for Burger and Company this southern situation
in Emporia had been "elevated" to a case of "racial balance" and no longer
could be regarded as intentional desegregation requiring the dismantling of
school districts.
If Emporia was the Burger Court's first punch in 1972, San Antonio
Independent School District u. Rodriguez,51 was its second blow in March, 1973.
Known popularly as "the school tax case" Rodriguez's importance must be
viewed in terms of the Court's heightening hostility to school desegregation. For
if quality education, as opposed to integrated or desegregated education, must
now be acknowledged as a primary goal, equalization of pupil expenditures,
despite the conclusion of the controversial Jencks study,52 is essential.
Prior to Rodriguez, Blacks in the District of Columbia whose hopes for
school integration had been buried under an avalanche known as the "tipping
45 Id. at 459.
46 Id. at 466.
47 Id. at 463.
48 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 6.
49 407 U.S. 451, 471-72 (1972).
50 Id. at 483.
51 93 S.Ct. 1278 (1973).
52 L. Jencks, Inequality, 1972.
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process"5 3 began legal efforts to end variations in pupil expenditures and teacher
salaries between White and Black schools.14 On the heels of the D.C. effort
came the now-famous California decision in Serrano v. Priest.15 In Serrano the
California Supreme Court found discrimination, and hence a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, in a public school finance system which relied on
property taxes. This system meant lower expenditures for education in eco-
nomically poor districts. Other courts also began to scrutinize school finance
systems.
56
With the proliferation of educational finance litigation and the relentless
controversy over school desegregation, many eyed the Supreme Court's pending
decision in Rodriguez with more than a passing interest.5 7 In fact, the Supreme
Court's holding in that decision is critical in setting the tone for American ed-
ucational progress for some time to come.
Rodriguez involved a highly complicated school financing system which
drew resources from the state, federal government, and local property taxes. For
purposes of simplicity only the most salient facts will be mentioned.5" Gross in-
equities existed between the poorest district in the area and the richest. Edge-
wood, the poorest, is heavily Mexican (90%) and Black (6%), whereas Alamo
Heights, the richest, is predominantly White (80%). For Edgewood the
average assessed property value per pupil stood at $5,960 and the median family
income at $4,686 (based on the 1960 census) compared with an assessed
property value per pupil in Alamo Heights of $49,000 and a median family
income of $8,001 (based on the 1960 census). While Edgewood's citizens
actually were taxed more heavily than Alamo Heights', it received less money
from the Texas Minimum School Program, the organization which provides half
of the educational expenses of Texas. That is, Alamo Heights secured $333 per
pupil on an equalized tax rate of 5 cents per $100 valuation and hence in return
obtained $225 per pupil from the Foundation, in 1967-68, Edgewood, in the
same year, raised $26 per pupil with an equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100
valuation thus permitting them to acquire only $222 from the Foundation
Program. By 1970-1971 Edgewood's share of the Foundation School Program
had risen to $356 per pupil, but affluent Alamo Heights' share increased to $4-91
per pupil.
The Rodriguez majority (Powell, Blackmun, Burger, Stewart and Rehn-
quist) probably dealt a fatal blow to those whose hopes for progress rest squarely
53 The "tipping point" is the point at which there is a tendency for "changes in the racial
composition of the school to intensify and 'snowball.'" Hobson v. Hansen, 320 F. Supp. 720,
722 (D.D.C. 1970).
54 Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971).
55 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
56 Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 118
N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (Super. Ct. 1972); Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.
2d 457 (1972).
57 Several law review articles already have appeared on Serrano and the much-awaited
Rodriguez decision. See, e.g., Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Deci-
sions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303 (1972); Simon, The School
Finance Decisions: Collective Bargaining and Future Finance Systems, 82 YALE L.J. 409
(1973); Goldstein, Interdistrict Inequalities in School Financing: A Critical Analysis of Ser-
rano v. Priest and Its Progeny, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 504 (1972).
58 For greater discussion of the facts of Rodriguez see the majority opinion and Justice
Marshall's dissent.
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on an effective and optimally funded educational system. Justice Powell first
considered "whether the Texas system of financing public schools operates to
the disadvantage of some suspect class .... ,1 This question involved the very
pivotal wealth discrimination issue. Refusing to read wealth discrimination into
the fourteenth amendment the Powell majority buttressed its negative con-
clusion by insisting that an "absolute deprivation" or an "absolute denial" of
"a meaningful opportunity" or "a desired benefit" must occur before the Con-
stitution comes into play. As the Court put it, "at least where wealth is involved
the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal
advantages."6 This is strange doctrine. As Justice Marshall correctly points
out: the Supreme Court
has never suggested that because some "adequate" level of benefits is
provided to all, discrimination in the provision of services is therefore con-
stitutionally excusable. The Equal Protection Clause is not addressed to
the minimal sufficiency but rather to the unjustifiable inequalities of state
action." 1
The majority also contended that a "definable category of 'poor' people"
must be identified. In an amazing twist of words, forced logic and hasty analysis
of the poor and their living conditions the Court pointed to "a recent and ex-
haustive study of school districts in Connecticut" which asserted that "it is
clearly incorrect . .. to contend that the 'poor' live in 'poor' districts." 2 From
this study Powell hastened to add that "the major factual assumption of Serrano
-that the educational finance system discriminates against the 'poor-is simply
false in Connecticut." '63 And, of course, if it is false in Connecticut, it is also
false in Texas and the rest of the country! The Court did not hesitate nor blink
an eyelash, however, in jumping to its conclusion: "For these two reasons-the
absence of any evidence that the financing system discriminates against any
definable category of 'poor' people or that it results in the absolute deprivation
of education-the disadvantaged class is not susceptible to identification in tra-
ditional terms." 4 Thus, those Mexican-Americans and Black Americans whose
schools have been poorly financed in comparison with those of more affluent
White Americans once again become "invisible men." Furthermore, who cares
if an eleventh-grader is being fed sixth-grade instruction--so long as it is "some"
instruction?
Having dropped the bombshell of "absolute deprivation" the Court went
on to emasculate the constitutionally based conclusion that education is a funda-
mental right. "Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit
protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying
it is implicitly so protected," intoned Justice Powell.65 From that point it be-
59 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1288 (1973).
60 Id. at 1291.
61 Id. at 1325.
62 Id. at 1291.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 1292.
65 Id. at 1297. See also Kirp, Schools as Sorters: The Constitutional and Policy Implica-
tions of Student Classification, 121 U. PA. L. Rxv. 705 (1973).
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came easy for the majority to refuse to subject the Texas financing system to
"strict judicial scrutiny." It became easy to conclude, too, that: 1) "the exis-
tence of some inequality [in the system] is not alone a sufficient basis for striking
down the entire system" 8 ; and 2) that "disparities" in spending "are not the
product of a system that is so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory."' 7
Finally, it became facile to assert what has now become a common position of
the Nixon appointees: that the matter should be "deferred to state legis-
latures." ' Thus, Mexican-Americans, Blacks, and other oppressed minorities
are hurled back into the laps of those same legislators who have proven hostile
to their interests down through the ages. Did the majority forget that the dis-
trict court had withheld its decision in Rodriguez for two years, eagerly awaiting
a Texas legislative response?"9
Justice Stewart's masterful concurring opinion is worthy of a passing com-
ment: "the method of financing public schools in Texas, as in almost every
other state, has resulted in a system of public education that can fairly be des-
cribed as chaotic and unjust."7 After that statement one would expect a cogent
analysis and a strong assertion of some constitutional violation. Instead, the
Justice weakly remarks, "It does not follow, however, and I cannot find, that
this system violates the Constitution of the United States."71 Blacks and Mexi-
can-Americans might well retort: "Then what good is the Constitution?"
The implications of Rodriguez will be debated for some time to come.
Yet one implication is not debatable: Blacks whose hopes for quality educa-
tion are squarely attached to the elimination of inequities in school financing
certainly cannot depend on the Burger Court for any assistance. Rodriguez
rudely slams the door in the faces of Blacks and Mexican-Americans by invoking
hideous and constitutionally alien phrases like "absolute deprivation" and "strict
judicial scrutiny."
If Rodriguez were not a sufficient and even total blow to educational
progress, Richmond School Board v. Virginia State Board of Education"2 repre-
sented the Burger Court's second 1973 punch. To one of the nation's most
significant issues in school desegregation the Court, with Justice Powell not
participating, handed down a terse per curiam opinion: "The judgment is
affirmed by an equally divided Court."7'  Had the Court lost sight of the furor
created by Judge Merhige's extensive opinion in Bradley v. School Board?74
Had the Court really nothing more to say on the highly combustible issue of
school consolidation to achieve school desegregation?
66 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1305-6 (1973).
67 Id. at 1308.
68 Id. at 1300.
69 Id. at 1316 n.2.
70 Id. at 1310.
71 Id.
72 93 S. Ct. 1540.
73 Id.
74 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Vir. 1972). Citizens for Neighborhood Schools in Richmond
hurried into action to boycott the schools as a manifestation of strong disagreement with the
consolidation. Plans also were laid for a huge protest motorcade from Richmond to Washing-
ton, D.C. Some Blacks opposing the decision issued a position paper, see Swinton, Position
Paper on the Richmond School Decision, BLAcx ECONoMic RESEAnCH CENTER, January 14,
1972.
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A closer look at the Richmond case is in order. The case centered around
school segregation in Richmond City, Henrico and Chesterfield counties, Vir-
ginia. One year after Brown was decided Richmond's school population was
43.4% Black, Chesterfield's 20.4% Black and Henrico's 10.4% Black. By
1972 the drift toward "one-race" schools could be seen as Richmond's Black
school population rose to 70% while Chesterfield's and Henrico's dropped each
to approximately 8-10%. For Judge Merhige the goals in Bradley were: 1)
"to create a unitary, nonracial system," and 2) "to achieve the greatest possible
degree of desegregation in formerly dual systems by the elimination of racially
identifiable schools. ' 75 The means suggested for reaching these goals were a
"HEW-formulated residential zone plan" and a "plaintiff-advocated metropolitan
area desegregation plan." The latter would involve not only a consolidation of
the school districts in Richmond and Chesterfield and Henrico counties but
also the busing of students. The consolidation would produce a 104,000-student
school district with one-third Black students. It was this consolidation plan
which Judge Merhige favored.
After examining the demographic realities of Richmond, Chesterfield, and
Henrico, Judge Merhige admitted that "desegregation of schools of the city and
counties . . . cannot be achieved within the current school division bounds."78
Instead of insisting that the school districts involved had gone as far as possible
in the struggle to "achieve the greatest possible degree of desegregation" the
judge argued that existing boundaries were not inviolable-that the "duty to
take whatever steps are necessary" to eliminate "racially identifiable schools"
in formerly dual systems "is not circumscribed by school division boundaries
created and maintained by the cooperative efforts of local and central state
officials." Thus Judge Merhige felt that state and local officials simply could not
hide behind extant political subdivisions as an excuse for not working for "the
greatest possible degree of desegregation" in schools. Judge Merhige also main-
tained that the neighborhood school pattern will not be tolerated if it perpetuates
a dual school system even in the face of a strong economic and social case for
the use of the neighborhood school concept as criterion for school assignment.
Yet another key proposition put forth by the court in Bradley asserted that hous-
ing patterns cannot be relied upon as an excuse for failure to desegregate school
systems. Blacks inhabit certain sections of Richmond in great numbers, the
court persisted, "because they have no choice" since "housing is generally not
available in other areas of the city." In light of this, school boards cannot evade
the duty to desegregate by fashioning school boundaries in accordance with
housing patterns since "to do so is only to endorse with official approval the
product of private racism."7 Judge Merhige then gave the state and local
agents and officials involved thirty days to "take all steps and perform all acts
necessary to create a single school division composed of the counties of Chester-
field and Henrico and the City of Richmond. 78
75 338 F. Supp. 67, 82 (E.D. Vir. 1972).
76 Id. at 100.
77 Id. at 88.
78 Id. at 245.
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The court of appeals, sitting en banc, reversed Judge Merhige, 7 feeling
that state-imposed segregation had been eliminated and that "one of the states
of the union [may not be compelled] to restructure its internal government for
the purpose of achieving racial balance in the assignment of pupils to the public
schools... absent invidious discrimination in the maintenance of local govern-
mental units."''s The court of appeals found no invidious discrimination. In
fact it stated:
Because we think that the last vestiges of state-imposed segregation
have been wiped out in the public schools of the City of Richmond and
the Counties of Henrico and Chesterfield and unitary school systems
achieved, and because it is not established that the racial composition of
the schools in the City of Richmond and the counties is the result of invid-
ious state action, we conclude there is no constitutional violation and that,
therefore, the district judge exceeded his power of intervention."'
Only Judge Winter dissented. He recalled "the sordid history of Vir-
ginia's and Richmond's attempt to circumvent, defeat, and nullify the holding
of Brown." 2 Then, too, he noted: "It was unfortunately predictable that a
court which approved the dismantling of existing school districts so as to create
smaller white enclaves, now rejects the consolidation of school districts to make
effective the mandate of Brown and its progeny."83
So the Supreme Court affirmed the crucial Richmond case without opinion
despite the opposite conclusions of the district court and the court of appeals.
It is not overexaggeration to state that that affirmation may well spell the death
knell of Brown and efforts to desegregate schools. Richmond, and presumably
Virginia which includes the horrible historical resistance of Prince Edward
County,8 4 for all intents and purposes have no further obligation to work towards
"the greatest possible degree of desegregation." Unhappily, segregated schools
on top of inequities in school financing merely draw the deprivation noose
more tightly around the necks of this country's minority citizens.
As if Rodriguez and Richmond were not sufficiently demoralizing to those
Blacks still insistent upon regarding the Supreme Court as friend and protector,
the Burger Court delivered a third blow in 1973 in Keyes v. School District
No. 1, Denver, Colorado.85 The Denver litigation is somewhat intricate be-
cause of its appeals and cross-appeals. To simplify it, we will note only that a
group of Denver parents brought suit accusing the Denver School Board of
maintaining racially and/or ethnically segregated schools through a conscious
use of certain discriminating techniques: manipulating student attendance
zones, selecting new school sites, and implementing a neighborhood school policy.
The District Court for the District of Colorado agreed with the parents by finding
that the school board "had engaged over almost a decade after 1960-in an
79 Bradley v. School Board, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972).
80 Id. at 1060.
81 Id. at 1070.
82 Id. at 1075.
83 Id. at 1071.
84 Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
85 93 S.Ct. 2686 (1973).
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unconstitutional policy of deliberate racial segregation" in terms of the schools
in one section of the district.8" But the parents also sought a decree declaring
the entire school system segregated. The district court felt, however, that a
policy of conscious, intentional or de jure segregation would have to be estab-
lished for each area of the district and refused to declare the entire Denver
School District a dual system.
A number of perplexing questions could have been resolved by the Court
in Keyes; to mention a few: 1) Is the continued distinction between de facto
and de jure segregation a practical and viable one?" 2) If the distinction be-
tween de facto and de jure segregation is to be maintained, does Brown apply
to de facto situations?8" 3) Assuming Brown cannot be enforced on a coopera-
tive basis, what are the constitutionally permissible methods-outside of bus-
ing-for achieving school desegregation, or school integration, or equality of
educational opportunity? 4) What are the constitutional limits on neighbor-
hood school policies in light of the goal of desegregation of schools?
Despite the opportunity to introduce some clarity in an alarmingly chaotic
school situation, Keyes in essence was another of the Court's nondecisions. The
Court did glance at the questions of whether Denver's entire school system con-
stituted a dual one;80 whether Denver's neighborhood school policy was "racially
neutral"; and whether the distinction between de facto and de jure segregation
should end." All of these issues, however, were lost in the Court's rush to re-
mand the case back to the Denver district court as if to wipe its hands free of
a sticky issue. Perhaps Justice Brennan could not muster the votes for the opin-
ion he really wanted to write and saw no alternatives but to beg for time by
remanding the case or see Keyes clearly added to the roll call of emasculated
and eviscerated decisions emanating from the Burger Court. Whatever the
reasons, instead of clarifying concepts and crystallizing goals in the area of public
education, the Court in Keyes merely reflected its confusion, its own apprehen-
sion, and its own frustration.
III. Conclusion
Like it or not, Blacks, whether integrationists or community (Black) con-
trol proponents, are caught up in an extremely powerful but conservative whirl-
wind with the Supreme Court lending its quieter but no less effectively conserva-
tive voice to balloon the eye of the storm already intensified by the strident
tones of persistently conservative executives and legislators. Appeals to the Su-
preme Court by minority groups to extricate them from the conservative whirl-
wind are futile.
86 303 F. Supp. 289, 295 (D. Colo. 1971).
87 See Karst and Horowitz, Emerging Nationwide Standards for School Desegregation-
Charlotte and Mobile, 1971, 1 BLAcK L. J. 206 (1971).
88 See, e.g., Note, De Facto School Segregation and the "State Action" Requirement:
A Suggested New Approach, 48 INDIANA L.J. 304 (1973); Silard, Toward Nationwide
School Desegregation: A "Compelling State Interest" Test of Racial Concentration on Public
Education, 51 NORTH CAROLINA L. REV. 675 (1973); Goodman, De Facto School Segregation:
A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 275 (1972).
89 93 S.Ct. 2686, 2689 (1973).
90 Id. at 2697.
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It is a lonely time for Blacks who have been cast aside by the Burger Court,
by the Executive branch, by federal and state legislatures, and by other institu-
tions of the American society. It is a time when the single most meaningful route
available may well be a pattern of self-help. It is a time when "We Shall Over-
come" is being turned over in the minds of many to read "Shall We Overcome?"
It is the time of a dangerously immobilizing pessimism for Blacks. But those
Blacks who marched boldly through the decade of the sixties daring any to chal-
lenge them might well remember that during their quest for justice and educa-
tion their ultimate faith never really rested in the nine men of the United States
Supreme Court.
